15 Apr Conditional Integration: Third-Country Participation in European Defence Procurement
The structural shift in joint defence procurement in Europe is being driven by war on the continent, fiscal pressure, and capability shortages revealed by high‑intensity warfare. While EU frameworks such as PESCO, the European Defence Fund (EDF), and European Defence Agency (EDA) programs are designed to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base, the role of non‑EU partners has become both unavoidable and strategically important. The question is no longer whether third countries can participate, but under what conditions and with which trade‑offs.
Legally, third‑country participation is already embedded (though tightly controlled) within EU defence instruments. PESCO allows non‑EU states to join individual projects if they provide “substantial added value,” share EU security objectives, and accept governance rules. Norway, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have all been admitted to specific PESCO projects, most notably Military Mobility, where regulatory alignment and infrastructure access matter more than industrial protectionism. EDF rules are stricter: third‑country entities cannot directly receive funding and are subject to ownership and control restrictions, though EU‑based subsidiaries can participate with limitations. The legal framework therefore supports targeted participation while safeguarding strategic technologies and intellectual property.
Strategically, third‑country involvement serves three main purposes. First is interoperability. European capability development cannot be divorced from NATO force structures, where the US, UK, Norway, Turkey, and Canada remain central actors. Joint procurement projects that exclude key operational partners risk producing technically compliant but operationally misaligned systems. This is particularly relevant in C4ISR, missile defence, and air and maritime enablers, where standards integration is as important as platform acquisition.
Second is industrial scalability and supply‑chain resilience. Europe’s defence industry remains fragmented, and since 2022 limits in manufacturing capacity, component shortages, and slow production expansion have demonstrated restricted surge capacity. Recent joint ammunition procurement schemes coordinated by the EDA illustrate the tension: political pressure favours “buy European,” but operational urgency pushes toward mixed sourcing.
Third is alliance cohesion. Structured openings for partners such as the UK create political bridges after Brexit, reducing duplication between EU and NATO planning. UK participation in selected projects aligns with its role as Europe’s leading military spender and nuclear power. By contrast, excluding Turkey from European defence formats can weaken operational effectiveness by removing access to a large defence industrial base and a geostrategic location spanning the Black Sea, Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, deeper inclusion is politically and legally sensitive due to sanctions regimes, arms export controls, and rule‑of‑law conditionality.
Military exercises present fewer legal barriers but similar strategic dilemmas. Non‑EU participation in EU‑led exercises and capability demonstrations is already common through NATO, ad hoc coalitions, and EDA frameworks, helping test multinational formations and new technologies under realistic conditions. However, when exercises are tied to EU capability development pipelines, sensitivities increase. Questions arise over data control, technology protection, and validation authority for results used in EU procurement and planning.
In conclusion, joint procurement is evolving into an instrument of geopolitical alignment as much as a tool for efficiency. While opening programs to third countries enhances capability coherence, it can dilute industrial sovereignty over strategic assets. Conversely, restricting access protects the European industrial base but may slow delivery, increase costs, and weaken interoperability. The resulting model of conditional integration allocates partner access project‑by‑project and technology‑by‑technology, regulated by security‑of‑supply and control clauses. The main takeaway is clear: European defence initiatives are not excluding partners, but are becoming more strategically and selectively open.
Author(s): Paula Gomila Marqués, SAHER Europe
Paula Gomila Marqués is a policy adviser and project manager specialising in international security, counterterrorism, European affairs and geopolitics. She currently works with SAHER Europe, where she contributes to their research initiatives and implements several projects related to topics like disinformation, the protection of public spaces, defence and digital policy. Paula has extensive experience managing and delivering European-level projects, and engaging with intelligence services, defence ministries, NATO, Europol, and the European Commission. Her work spans regulatory analysis (including the Digital Services Act, Terrorist Content Online Regulation, and AI Act), counterterrorism policy, online extremism, and risk analysis within the tech and security landscapeShe holds a Master’s degree in International Security from the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals and specialised training in Terrorism and Counterterrorism from Georgetown University.